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UAV
Helem S. Sánchez, Damiano Rotondo, Marc López Vidal, Joseba Quevedo
Abstract— Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are reported to
be highly exposed as possible targets of cyber attacks, due to
their strong strategic and economic value, and their increasing
use in a wide range of operations. Among the most critical
cyber attacks, replay attacks are performed by replacing the
real data coming from the sensors with previously recorded
data, causing deterioration of the control system’s performance
and potentially allowing other types of attacks without being
discovered. The main contribution of this paper is to investigate
the applicability of a frequency-based detection method, which
uses a sinusoidal signal with a time-varying frequency as
authentication signal, to a UAV affected by replay attacks. The
effectiveness of the method is illustrated through simulation
scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the increasing integration of cyber (com-
putation, communication, etc.) and physical processes has
led to the introduction of a new class of systems, known as
cyber-physical systems (CPSs) [1]. CPSs are characterized
by a higher efficiency, but also by bigger vulnerabilities,
which can be exploited by a malicious agent in order to
perform a cyber attacks, resulting in some kind of damage
or economical loss [2], [3].
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are reported to be
highly exposed as possible targets of cyber attacks, due
to their strong strategic and economic value, and their
increasing use in a wide range of operations, such as border
surveillance, reconnaissance, transport, and even civilian
tasks, as e.g. fun by hobby enthusiasts [4]. Among the attacks
reported for UAVs, we recall the one performed in 2012
during a flight test in South Korea, in which a GPS jamming
attack was executed on a S-100 Camcopter, resulting in a
crash into the ground control van, which lead to the killing
of an engineer and the injuring of two remote pilots [5].
Due to the importance of assessing the vulnerabilities
of UAVs, and developing new defense mechanisms, which
could help in mitigating them, simulations of cyber attacks
on UAVs are being executed [6]. [7] performed a GPS
spoofing attack on a quadrotor, resulting in the UAV landing
at an incorrect location. A deauthentication attack on a
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quadrotor was used by [8] to demonstrate its vulnerability,
resulting in the loss of control by the operator. The work [9]
showed that a hacker can exploit shared data and predictable
collision avoidance properties in order to control and alter
the UAV’s trajectory.
Among the most critical cyber attacks, there are the replay
attacks. When an attack of this type is carried out, at first
the attacker records the measurements coming from the
sensors. Later, the attacker replaces the real data with the
recorded one, causing deterioration of the control system’s
performance and potentially allowing other types of attacks
without being discovered. The threats to the security of UAVs
brought by this type of attack have been well documented,
see e.g. [10], [11]. In the last few years, different approaches
have been proposed to detect these attacks, which may be
classified roughly into two categories: i) watermarking-based
approaches [12]–[16], in which an authentication signal is
added to the control signal (at the cost of sacrificing the
control performance), and the received sensor measurements
are analyzed to check whether there is or there is not the
effect of the authentication signal on the physical system;
and ii) alternative methods [17], [18], which try to detect
replay attacks without injecting signals in the control input.
The work [16] presented a method to detect replay attacks
using a frequency-based signature, which was applied to a
multiple tank system. The main contribution of the present
paper is to investigate its applicability to a UAV affected
by replay attacks. In particular, the method introduces a
sinusoidal signal with a time-varying frequency (authentica-
tion signal) into the closed-loop system, and checks whether
the time profile of the frequency components in the output
signals are compatible with the authentication signal or not,
by comparing the energies of appropriate signals.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section II, the frequency-based replay attack detection
technique is presented. Section III describes the application
of the proposed method to a quadrotor. Section IV presents
the simulation results. Finally, Section V provides the con-
clusions.
II. REPLAY ATTACK DETECTION METHOD
A. Attack definition and overview of the detection method
Replay attacks corrupt the measurements coming from the
sensors, and are carried out in two stages [12]:
1) in the first stage, the attacker records sensor data y(t) in
a time window [t0, t0 +w], where w denotes the attack
duration, without compromising their integrity;
2) in the second stage, the recorded data are used to replace
the real data, such that the controlled system is exposed
to some kind of harm without the supervisory unit/agent
being aware of it, e.g., the system could be driven to a
different operating point, or some act of theft/sabotage
could be performed.
Hereafter, we recall the method proposed in [16], which
detects replay attacks (also identifying which output channels
are being attacked) by introducing a sinusoidal signal with
a time-varying frequency into the system. Then, the detec-
tor makes a decision by checking if the measured output
is compatible with the introduced signature or not. More
specifically, by applying a dynamical decoupling technique
based on vector fitting [19], it can be ensured that a given
input channel will affect only an output channel, which
allows identifying which channel is being attacked. Finally,
the detector compares the energies of band-pass signals to
determine if a replay attack is being carried out or not.
B. Signal generation
Let us consider a continuous-time linear time invariant
system:
ẋ(t) = Ax(t)+Bu(t) (1)
y(t) =Cx(t) (2)
where x ∈ Rn is the state, u ∈ Rm is the input, y ∈ Rp
is the output, and A, B, C denote matrices of appropriate
dimensions. The system (1)-(2) is controlled by means of a
state-feedback control law:
u(t) =−Kx(t) (3)
such that the closed-loop system is described by:
ẋ(t) = (A−BK)x(t) (4)
The frequency-based method for replay attack detection
introduces a signature ς(t) into the input u(t), such that:
u(t) =−Kx(t)+ ς(t) (5)
It is straightforward to see that ς(t) will affect the output
y(t) according to the transfer function:
G(s) =C (sI−A+BK)−1 B (6)
which usually contains coupling, i.e. a signature signal ςi(t)
introduced in the i-th input channel will contribute to the
response of all the output signals contained in y(t). Since
we would like to use the signature signals to identify which
channel is affected by the replay attack, we introduce a
decoupler F(s) with input ς̃(t) and output ς(t), such that
the series interconnection Gd(s) = G(s)F(s) is a decoupled
system, i.e. made up by a diagonal transfer matrix. Then, we
can introduce frequency-varying sinusoidal signals:




i = 1, . . . ,m (7)
into the decoupler, where α̃i denotes the signals’ magnitudes,
and σi(t) denote piecewise constant signals, taking integer
values between 1 and N, such that at each instant of time
ωσi(t) take values within a set of predetermined frequencies
{ω1, . . . ,ωN}, according to the value of ςi(t). The idea behind
introducing (7) is that by analyzing the output signals, we
can decide about the attack occurrence by checking if the
received output is compatible with the introduced signals or
not.
It is clear that, since a complete decoupling of G(s)F(s)
is very demanding, and in some cases cannot be achieved
at all [20], we can require decoupling for the finite set of
frequencies ωi, i = 1, . . . ,N. More specifically, by requiring
that F(ιωi) =G(ιωi)−1, a set of N constraints that the decou-
pler should satisfy is obtained. Then, the robust numerical
method for rational approximation known as vector fitting
can be applied [21].
C. Detection logic
The output signal y(t) will contain the effects of the
different inputs to the process, e.g. the input signal u(t). With
the aim of analyzing only the content due to the signature
signal ξ̃(t), y(t) is processed through a bank of band-pass
filters (each filter corresponding to a different frequency ωi,












where Qi is the selectivity of the filter, bigger values of
which correspond to a narrower frequency response, but also
a slower dynamic response.
Let us denote as zil(t) the output of the filter Hi(s) fed
by yl(t). Then, we can obtain an estimate σ̂l(t) of σl(t) by
comparing the different signals zil(t). As proposed in [16],
a possible way to obtain σ̂l(t) is to compare the energies of







while also taking into account the time ttrans needed after
a switch in σl(t) in order for the transient to become
neglectable. Then, the signals σ̂l(t) are calculated as (10) (see
top of the next page), where t∗s = bt/TscTs denotes the last
switching time. Then, the replay attack detection algorithm
will compare the known signals σl(t) with the estimated
signals σ̂l(t). If a mismatch is found, the algorithm will warn
about yl(t) being corrupted by a replay attack.
III. APPLICATION TO A QUADROTOR
In this section, we present the application of the frequency-
based replay attack detection method to a quadrotor.
A. Linearized model
The quadrotor is a vehicle that has four rotors in a cross
configuration. Two rotors can rotate in a clockwise direction,
while the other two can rotate anticlockwisely. The four
rotors are controlled independently, and their speeds affect
the overall movement of the quadrotor. It is assumed that
the quadrotor has a rigid and symmetrical structure, with
σ̂l(t) =







center of gravity that coincides with the body fixed frame,
and rigid propellers, which provide thrust and drag forces
that are proportional to the square of the propellers’ speeds.
Let us introduce the state vector x =
[
z, ż,φ, φ̇,θ, θ̇,ψ, ψ̇
]T
and the input vector u = [Ω1,Ω2,Ω3,Ω4]
T , where z is the
height, φ, θ, ψ are the roll, pitch and yaw angle, respectively,
and Ω1,Ω2,Ω3,Ω4 are the rotor speeds. By applying a con-
stant feedforward input ue = [Ω1,e,Ω2,e,Ω3,e,Ω4,e]
T , with:





a hovering equilibrium point is obtained, characterized by a
constant equilibrium state xe (in particular, the equilibrium
height is a value ze, and the equilibrium angles φe, θe and
ψe are all zero). Then, by considering deviations ∆x of the
state variables from xe, and performing a linearization of the
nonlinear state equations (see [23], [24]), a model akin to
(1) is obtained:
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which, together with a linear error-feedback control law
∆u(t) =−K∆x(t), leads to the closed-loop system:
∆ẋ(t) = (A−BK)∆x(t)
We will assume that both the altitude and the attitude of
the quadrotor are monitored by a ground station. The com-
munication between the UAV and the station can be hacked
through a replay attack. Hence, the system’s description (1)-
(2) is completed by the output matrix C, which is given by:
C =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0




Parameter Value Unit Parameter Value Unit
Ix 8.1e−3 Nms2 J 104e−6 Nms2
Iy 8.1e−3 Nms2 l 0.24 m
Iz 14.2e−3 Nms2 b 54.2e−6 Ns2
m 1 kg d 1.1e−6 Nms2
g 9.81 ms−2
or, equivalently, by defining ∆y(t) = y(t)− [ze,φe,θe,ψe]T :
∆y(t) =C∆x(t)
Also, for the remaining of the manuscript, we will assume
that the quadrotor’s parameters are the ones provided in Table
I, where Ix, Iy, Iz denote the body inertia along x, y, z axes,
m is the quadrotor’s mass, g denotes the gravity acceleration,
J is the propeller inertia, l is the lever’s length, and b and d
are the thrust and drag factor, respectively.
B. Choice of the design parameters
Let us consider a replay attack detector, as described in
the previous section, with N = 2 and ω2 = 2ω1. Due to the






the following relationship holds between the magnitudes α̃1,
α̃2, α̃3, α̃4 of ξ̃1, ξ̃2, ξ̃3, ξ̃4 (input signals to the decoupler)
and the maximum magnitudes ᾱ1, ᾱ2, ᾱ3, ᾱ4 of ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4












where the max is understood element-wise. By requiring that:
ᾱl ≤ κlue,l , l = 1, . . . ,nu (15)
where κl  1 and ue,l is the l-th element of ue, such that
the increment of the input signal brought by the signature
signal is relatively small, a set of feasible frequencies is
calculated, and ω1 is chosen as the maximum value among
these frequencies. The values α̃l , l = 1, . . . ,4 are design
parameters whose values should be chosen small enough
such that ξ̃(t) is not clearly visible in the output signals, and
big enough to overcome the effect of exogenous disturbances
and measurement noise. In the following, we select κ1 =
κ2 = κ3 = κ4 = 1/10 and α̃1 = 0.005 and α̃2 = α̃3 = α̃4 =
0.01.
Four different controllers K1, K2, K3, K4 have been con-
sidered in order to study how the particular choice of the
controller affected both the set of feasible frequencies for
TABLE II
CLOSED-LOOP POLES POSITION





ω1 and the decoupling performance of the decoupler F(s).
All the controllers have been designed by pole placement, by
requiring that the closed-loop poles were placed in different
positions of the complex plane, as resumed in Table II.
Eq. (14) has been used to calculate the expected ᾱ (due
to symmetry of the quadrotor, α1 = α2 = α3 = α4) for the
different controllers, such that (15) can be checked graphi-
cally, as shown in Fig. 1. Using the controller K1, a value
ω1 = 5.1rad/s has been found, while with the controllers
K2 and K3, ω1 = 3.3rad/s and ω1 = 0.3rad/s have been
obtained. On the other hand, no feasible frequency ω1 was
found for controller gain K4. Although in principle it is
desired to obtain a value of ω1 as high as possible, so that Tω
in (9) becomes smaller, and the detection algorithm based on
estimating σ̂l(t) using (10) behaves faster, the choice of ω1
should take into account the decoupler performance which,
looking at (13), depends on the specific controller gain (the
decoupler can be obtained applying the VFIT3 routine1 [19],
[25], as described in [16]).
In particular, Fig. 2 shows the Bode plot of the transfer
function from the input 1 to the output 1 of the cascade
G(s)F(s), for the different controller gains K1, K2, K3. Note
that the values on the x-axis are normalized with respect to
ω1, such that ωnorm = 1rad/s corresponds to ω = 5.1rad/s,
ω = 3.3rad/s and ω = 0.3rad/s, respectively. It can be
seen that the best decoupling performance is achieved with
the controller K3. However, using K3 would lead to ω1 =
0.3rad/s and, through (9), to Tω = 20.94s, ultimately leading
to a very slow attack detector. For this reason, using K2
(ω1 = 3.3rad/s, Tω = 1.91s) is deemed to be a good tradeoff
between a fast detector and a good decoupling, and will
be the controller used in the next section. By requiring an
attenuation of −20dB at frequency ω2 for the first band-pass
filter, and at frequency ω1 for the second band-pass filter, the
selectivity parameters are calculated as Q1 = Q2 = 2
√
11.
Also, ttrans is chosen as the biggest among the settling times
of the band-pass filters Hi(s), and Ts is chosen as Ts = 4ttrans,
as in [16], thus obtaining ttrans = 15.87s and Ts = 63.48s.
For the sake of completeness, Fig. 3 shows the comparison
between the magnitude Bode plot of the non-decoupled (blue
line) system and the decoupled one (red line). It can be
seen that the series interconnection G(s)F(s) approximates
an identity matrix, such that a good decoupling is achieved.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed strat-




























Fig. 1. Graphical check of condition (15).
























Fig. 2. Decoupling performance (Bode plot of the transfer function from
input 1 to output 1 for the cascade G(s)F(s), using different controller
gains).
the attacker records the measurements of the first output dur-
ing the first 200s, and replays periodically the data starting
from t = 200s. The arising mismatch between the outputs
of the band-pass filters z11(t), z21(t) and the time-varying
frequency profile of ωσ1(t) (see Fig. 4) allows detecting
the attack after 8.21s, as shown in Fig. 5, which depicts
the logical assessment of σi(t) == σ̂i(t), i = 1,2,3,4. In
Scenario 2, the attacker corrupts the measurements y2(t) and
y3(t) instead. In this case, the mismatches σ̂2(t) 6= σ2(t) and
σ̂3(t) 6= σ3(t) allow identifying correctly the output channels
as being attacked at time 398.65s and 208.21s, respectively
(see Figs. 6-7).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work has investigated the applicability of a
frequency-based replay attack detection method to a quadro-
tor UAV. In particular, the method introduces a sinusoidal





































































































Fig. 3. Decoupling performance (Bode plots).
system, and checks whether the time profile of the frequency
components in the output signals are compatible with the
authentication signal or not, by comparing the energies of
appropriate signals. The simulation scenarios have shown
that the method can be applied to the considerate case study,
being capable of not triggering false alarms and identifying
correctly the attacked output channels.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Antsaklis, “Goals and challenges in cyber-physical systems research
editorial of the editor in chief,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 12, no. 59, pp. 3117–3119, 2014.
[2] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dörfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identi-
fication in cyber-physical systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 2715–2729, 2013.
[3] D. Rotondo, H. S. Sánchez, V. Puig, T. Escobet, and J. Quevedo, “A
virtual actuator approach for the secure control of networked LPV
systems under pulse-width modulated dos attacks,” Neurocomputing,
2019.
[4] K. Hartmann and C. Steup, “The vulnerability of UAVs to cyber
attacks-an approach to the risk assessment,” in Cyber Conflict (Cy-
Con), 2013 5th International Conference on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–23.
[5] K. Wesson and T. Humphreys, “Hacking drones,” Scientific American,
vol. 309, no. 5, pp. 54–59, 2013.
[6] C. L. Krishna and R. R. Murphy, “A review on cybersecurity vulner-
abilities for unmanned aerial vehicles,” in Safety, Security and Rescue
Robotics (SSRR), 2017 IEEE International Symposium on. IEEE,
2017, pp. 194–199.
[7] S.-H. Seo, B.-H. Lee, S.-H. Im, and G.-I. Jee, “Effect of spoofing on
unmanned aerial vehicle using counterfeited GPS signal,” Journal of
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 57–65, 2015.
[8] M. Hooper, Y. Tian, R. Zhou, B. Cao, A. P. Lauf, L. Watkins,
W. H. Robinson, and W. Alexis, “Securing commercial wifi-based
UAVs from common security attacks,” in Military Communications
Conference, MILCOM 2016-2016 IEEE. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1213–1218.
[9] P. Pierpaoli, M. Egerstedt, and A. Rahmani, “Altering UAV flight
path by threatening collision,” in Digital Avionics Systems Conference
(DASC), 2015 IEEE/AIAA 34th. IEEE, 2015, pp. 4A4–1.
[10] M. Verup and M. Olin, “Security models and exploitations in theory
and practice for unmanned aerial vehicles,” 2016.
[11] K. Highnam, K. Angstadt, K. Leach, W. Weimer, A. Paulos, and
P. Hurley, “An uncrewed aerial vehicle attack scenario and trustworthy
repair architecture,” in Dependable Systems and Networks Workshop,
2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on. IEEE,
2016, pp. 222–225.
[12] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Secure control against replay attacks,” in
Communication, Control, and Computing, 2009. Allerton 2009. 47th
Annual Allerton Conference on. IEEE, 2009, pp. 911–918.
[13] S. Weerakkody, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks
on control systems using robust physical watermarking,” in Decision
and Control (CDC), 2014 IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on. IEEE,
2014, pp. 3757–3764.
[14] C. Fang, Y. Qi, P. Cheng, and W. X. Zheng, “Cost-effective watermark
based detector for replay attacks on cyber-physical systems,” in
Control Conference (ASCC), 2017 11th Asian. IEEE, 2017, pp. 940–
945.
[15] A. Khazraei, H. Kebriaei, and F. R. Salmasi, “A new watermarking
approach for replay attack detection in LQG systems,” in Decision




















































































]z13(t) z23(t) ωσ 3(t)































Fig. 4. Scenario 1. Outputs of the band-pass filters zil(t) and time-varying
frequency ωσ(t).
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Fig. 5. Scenario 1. Result of the replay attack detection test.
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Fig. 6. Scenario 2. Outputs of the band-pass filters zil(t) and time-varying
frequency ωσ(t).





























Fig. 7. Scenario 2. Result of the replay attack detection test.
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